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1. Introduction 
One of the purposes of this article is to develop further some of the 
ideas that appear in my book Then Athena Said: Unilateral Transfers and the 
Transformation of Objectivist Ethics.1 The book examines unilateral transfers 
within the framework of Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand. The type 
of unilateral transfer on which this article focuses is charity. I extract from the 
book some of the key principles it addresses, stating them in the form of 
propositions. I also refine some of the definitions of the key concepts that 
appear in the book. 
2. A Principle Is a Strategy that If Followed Consistently Will Lead to 
Long-Run Success 
The first definition to revisit is that of a (moral) principle. Rand 
defines a principle as “a fundamental, primary, or general truth, on which 
other truths depend.”2 Ronald Merrill claims that Rand’s ethics are based on 
long-run success.3 Rand is aware of the stochastic in life, but believes that 
consistently following principles is the best way to bet.4 My revised definition 
of a moral principle is that it is a strategy that if followed consistently will 
lead to long-run success.  
1 Kathleen Touchstone, Then Athena Said: Unilateral Transfers and the 
Transformation of Objectivist Ethics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
2006).
2 Ayn Rand, “The Anatomy of Compromise,” in Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown 
Ideal (New York: Signet, 1967), p. 144. 
3 Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New 
York: Signet, 1964), p. 24. 
4 Ronald E. Merrill, The Ideas of Ayn Rand (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991), pp. 114-
15.
Reason Papers Vol. 30 
In decision theory, this strategy is consistent with the maximization 
of utility for binary choice. According to Herbert Simon: 
How would a utility-maximizing subject behave in the binary choice 
experiment? Suppose that the experimenter rewarded “plus” on one-
third of the trials, determined at random, and “minus” on the 
remaining two-thirds. Then a subject, provided that he believed the 
sequence was random and observed that minus was rewarded twice 
as often as plus, should always, rationally, choose minus. He would 
find the correct answer two-thirds of the time, and more often than 
with any other strategy.5
Rand’s aim is to ground ethics in human nature.6 A pertinent 
question then is, is this the way individuals behave?  Simon notes that more 
often, subjects of these kinds of experiments tend to event match; that is, they 
tend to select between two alternatives with approximately the same relative 
frequencies as those that underlie the experiment.7 However, William K. 
Estes points out that if the test subject is rewarded for successful predictions 
and punished for unsuccessful ones, the inclination is to predict based on the 
greater probability.8 Moral principles should be based on long-run success; 
however, does that necessarily mean that the alternative will result in failure 
(i.e., punishment)?9 To deal with this question, what needs to be addressed is 
what constitutes “success.”10
3. Survival Is the Basis for Success 
The second proposition deals with the question, what is the basis for 
success?  The answer is consistent with Rand’s position that survival is the 
5 Herbert A. Simon, “Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral 
Science,” The American Economic Review 49, no. 3 (June 1959), p. 260. 
6 Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” p. 22. 
7 Ibid. 
8 William K. Estes, “Research and Theory on the Learning of Probabilities,” Journal of 
American Statistical Association 67, no. 337 (March 1972), p. 83. 
9 Conditions surrounding ethical choice are not the same as those described for these 
experiments.
10 It could be argued that decisions cannot always be described as binary. However, in 
their most basic form, ethical issues are. Honesty versus dishonesty is fundamentally 
dichotomous.
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basis for success. According to Rand, life is the ultimate value.11 J. Charles 
King objects that life may more properly be considered an instrumental 
variable.12 For the purposes of this article, it is a moot point, since, in any 
case, if one does not live, one cannot achieve any other value. It is 
acknowledged that a man cannot live forever, and that there is always a non-
zero probability that he may die due to unforeseen events. That being said, it 
is still the case that death cannot serve as the objective of one’s actions in the 
normal course of a person’s existence. Death, then, cannot be the end of one’s 
actions nor can it be a measure of success. 
Rand’s fundamental alternative is existence or non-existence—life or 
death. Ethics inherently involves choice. If there were only one course of 
action to take, there would be no ethical issue involved.13 Yet there must be 
something attractive about the alternative in order for it to be considered 
“choiceworthy.”  Death is not, generally speaking, an alternative a person 
would choose. However, there are choices that may appear to have perceived 
or short-term gains, yet not be strategies that are successful long-range. The 
principled alternative is the one that results in long-term success. This does 
not mean that the principled choice will always yield success. There is a 
stochastic component to ethical decisions. Nevertheless, the ethical alternative 
is the one that should be acted upon since consistency results in long-run 
success. 
4. To Sustain One’s Life, Productivity Is Required on the Part of the 
Individual 
The third proposition addresses what actions a person must take in 
order to sustain himself. The focus is on the individual. Care should be taken 
in applying the long-run probabilities approach to deriving ethical principles. 
If this technique were employed, then it would be concluded that women 
should not marry or have children since these are correlated with lower life 
expectancies for women. To the extent the word “probable” applies, it should 
probably be “within the confines of the definition of ‘that which can be 
supported by good argument.’”14
11 Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” p. 17. 
12 Charles J. King, “Life and the Theory of Value: The Randian Argument 
Reconsidered,” in The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, ed. Douglas J. Den Uyl and 
Douglas B. Rasmussen (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 111. 
13 Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” p. 15. 
14 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, p. 7. 
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One method of approaching this question is to examine a man in 
isolation, for example, on a desert island. Murray Rothbard uses this device in 
his books The Ethics of Liberty and Man, Economy, and State.15 Although 
Rand does not use it as an analytical tool, she uses the desert island as a 
metaphor.16 To survive, a person would have to consume. However, a person 
must produce before he can consume. This assertion is consistent with Gary 
Becker’s definition of production.17 Production can be defined broadly to be 
those actions taken that (ultimately) result in consumption. Adam Smith 
regards consumption as the end of production.18 Thus, in order to sustain 
one’s life, a person would have to produce. Although the man would own the 
product of his efforts, property rights would not be relevant to a man in 
isolation. 
Of course, men do not live in isolation. They live among other men. 
In order to produce, and thus consume and survive, resources must be used. If 
resources are sufficiently abundant, the problem of scarcity is not an issue. A 
person may use abundant resources to produce. Problems may arise, however, 
once a resource becomes scarce, particularly if property rights to the resource 
have not been established. Then disputes may arise over dispensation of the 
resource. Without property rights, the outcome of interaction between two 
individuals with respect to a scarce resource could be zero-sum; that is, there 
could be a winner and a loser.19 Using game theory, an example of a zero-sum 
outcome under the assumption of a maximin decision criterion (for Player A 
and minimax for Player B) is shown in Appendix A.  
15 Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises 
Institute, 1993); Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998). 
16 Ayn Rand, “This Is John Galt Speaking,” in Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual
(New York: Signet, 1961), p. 127. 
17 Ramon Febrero and Pedro S. Schwartz, “Introduction,” in The Essence of Becker,
ed. Ramon Febrero and Pedro S. Schwartz (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 
1995), p. xxi; Gary S. Becker, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,” in The Essence of 
Becker, p. 186. 
18 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1937 
[1776]), p. 625. 
19 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, p. 80. Although these are two-person cases, the point 
I am making here can be generalized. Without property rights, disputes can arise over 
resources. That is, in disputes over unowned resources, the outcome may be that there 
is a winner (or winners) and a loser (or losers).  
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Also shown is an example of a mixed strategy. In his book The 
Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare, Robert Sugden discusses the 
emergence of conventions in a state of nature.20 There are situations in which 
a resource, such as geographical space, may be used “in common” without 
established rules for its use. An example would be on which side of the street 
to drive. Some drivers may always drive on the right, others always on the 
left, and still others may drive on the right at times and on the left at others. 
Intuitively, it would seem preferable for all drivers always to drive either on 
the right or on the left. Thus a mixed strategy would be suboptimal. Sugden 
describes a convention as a strategy that emerges spontaneously from two (or 
more) alternatives in which both (all) are arbitrary.21 A convention is more 
likely to be established if there is some salient feature about one of the 
alternatives that is recognized by the “players.”  Once a convention is 
established, then the individual will follow the single strategy. It is in the 
interest of the person to do so (even if an alternative convention would have 
brought about more favorable results).22 There is no longer a “choice” 
between (or among) the two (or more) alternatives. The way in which I 
approach ethical choice is very similar to conventions in the sense that once a 
principle is determined, there is no longer a “choice” concerning whether to 
follow it or not. A difference between conventions and principles is that the 
initial alternatives are arbitrary for conventions, but not for principles. The 
principled alternative is the one that results in long-term success. 
5. The Principle of Reciprocity Results in Long-Run Success 
Once property rights are defined, it is no longer necessary for an 
individual to rely solely upon himself to produce all that he needs for his 
consumption. He may produce and exchange part of what he produces with 
another (or others). Ownership is a prerequisite for trade, since one must own 
something in order to exchange it for something else. Individuals have an 
incentive to engage in exchange. As Adam Smith recognized, there are mutual 
benefits to trade.23 Rand elevates this to a principle. She defines the Trader 
Principle as the bilateral exchange of value for value between independent 
equals.24
20 Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986). 
21 Ibid., p. 33. 
22 Ibid., p. 48. 
23 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 423. 
24 Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” p. 31. 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) can be used to examine the decision 
process that underlies exchange between two players. A hypothetical payoff 
matrix for a PD situation is shown in Appendix B. The incentive structure is 
such that if both “players” follow the dominant strategy, both will defect. If 
exchange takes place, then there are greater benefits for both players than if 
each defects. Exchange is positive sum. There are apparent benefits to one 
person unilaterally defecting, since by doing so the defector keeps his own 
goods and is a receiver of goods from the other player. This is the default or 
theft option in which one of the players forces a zero-sum outcome. 
Principles are those strategies, that if consistently followed yield 
success. Productivity is a life-affirming strategy. Alternatively, theft as a 
principle—that is, as a strategy that is consistently followed—will not lead to 
success. A person may steal all the time and be “successful.”  However, if he 
is, it is because he has been “lucky.”  Principles cannot be based on “luck,” 
since luck is stochastic.  
Unilateral defection (or theft) would seem to be the best strategy for 
a “golden opportunity” in which the probability of detection is low for the 
defector. (This is analogous to the one-shot PD in which the players are 
anonymous and there is no chance of subsequent interaction between them.) 
However, calculating the probability for a single event is difficult, if not 
impossible. Also, as Robert Frank points out in his book Passions within 
Reason, commitment to principled behavior sustains the emotions necessary 
to maintain that behavior.25 If a person indulges in cheating when detection is 
low, he will not be able to sustain the emotions necessary to act on principle 
when detection is not low. It follows that if one is “caught,” the outcome will 
be unsuccessful. Based on this reasoning, grounded in human nature, even in 
the one-shot PD case, it “pays” to follow the principled course.  
The benefits to unilateral defection are more apparent than real, 
particularly if there is the expectation of retaliation. In The Evolution of 
Cooperation, Robert Axelrod finds that a strategy of reciprocity known as Tit-
for-Tat results in long-term success in repeated games of the PD.26 Thus, the 
principle of reciprocity results in success in the long-term. The principle of 
reciprocity entails the exchange of value for value. It also prescribes 
(proportional) retaliation if an individual defects on payment for value 
received.27 If unilateral defection appears attractive, it may be because there 
25 Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1988), pp. 90-91. 
26 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 
50-55.
27 Touchstone, Then Athena Said,  pp. 53-55. 
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are costs, such as those associated with retaliation, that have not been 
explicitly accounted for in the payoff structure underlying the PD.28
As a general strategy, theft (or, more generally, involuntary unilateral 
transfers) will not lead to success. However, when living among others, rather 
than in isolation, it is possible for a nonproductive person to survive through 
voluntary unilateral transfers. Two such examples might be inheritance and 
charity. Of course, these transfers are made possible as the result of the 
productivity of others. Someone must produce. Adam Smith regards 
consumption to be the end of production, but production must precede 
consumption. I state above that “a person should be productive.”  A more 
complete statement is that a person should not consume more than he 
produces. An individual’s productivity should equal or exceed his 
consumption. 
6. Production Should Equal or Exceed Consumption (Over the Course of 
One’s Life) 
At varying times in one’s life, production may exceed consumption 
in some instances, and consumption may exceed production in others. But 
over the course of one’s life, one’s production should not fall short of his 
consumption. There may be temporary setbacks, but the norm in human life, 
as Isabel Paterson points out in The God in the Machine, is not misfortune.29
28 Axelrod’s model goes beyond the one-shot PD. This is required in order that there 
be retaliation. The above discussion is vague about what is meant by retaliation. 
Axelrod examines spontaneous cooperation without a central enforcement authority; 
see Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 3 and 138. In a “state of nature” (that 
is, with no government), retaliation would be the responsibility of the individual. In 
Axelrod’s model, the definition of retaliation is simplistic and narrow; specifically, it 
means not trading in the future with a defaulter. Even within Axelrod’s framework, 
retaliation could be made more onerous; for example, the defector could be required to 
pay damages. In the real world, the form that retaliation would take would depend on 
the nature of the “crime.”  One objective would be that punishment would fit the 
crime; that is, retribution should be proportional. Once a centralized governing 
authority has been established, retaliation is taken out of the hands of the individual. 
Government enforcement of contracts (property rights) “solves” the PD in the sense 
that the costs of defection are more generally recognizable and explicit. If properly 
accounted for in the payoff matrix, defection would no longer be the dominant strategy 
for either player. Retaliation against defectors (thieves) is delegated to government. 
The basis for retaliation would still be the principle of reciprocity, but retaliation 
would no longer be a factor in an individual’s ethical code. 
29 In Stephen Cox’s biography of Isabel Paterson, he indicates that Rand was 
disappointed with Paterson’s failure to acknowledge Rand as the source of the ethical 
theory presented in The God in the Machine. In Cox’s view, there is no indication that 
Paterson’s views were altered by exposure to Rand’s theory; see Stephen Cox, The 
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Misfortune is the exception in life.30 This principle is referred to by Leonard 
Peikoff as the Benevolent Universe Premise (BUP).31 It follows that, except 
for temporary setbacks, a person should not accept charity. In fact, long term, 
it should not be necessary.  
Charity is inconsistent with the principle of reciprocity because it is 
unilateral in nature. There is no exchange of value for value. However, the 
principle of reciprocity, or more narrowly, the Trader Principle as defined by 
Rand, is the bilateral trade between independent equals. Some individuals are 
dependent by nature; children, for instance. They rely on unilateral transfers 
for their survival, but this typically does not pose a problem since their parents 
provide for them. However, there may be children or those with diminished 
capacity who are abandoned or abused by their caregivers and have no means 
of support.32 The circumstance for these individuals may be more than a 
temporary setback.  
Of course, another person’s need cannot be the sole reason for 
charitable giving even if the need is justified. Although in relative terms, the 
number of those in such a situation should be few, a single person cannot give 
even a modest amount to all of them, much less enough to sustain their 
existence. A principle has been defined as a strategy that if consistently 
followed will yield success in the long-run. Being productive is principled 
behavior because it sustains a person’s life. If charitable giving were regarded 
as principled behavior, then a person should be able consistently to give to 
others. If charity were on par with productivity, then it would seem to follow 
that devoting the equivalent time, energy, and resources to charitable activities 
as one would spend on one’s work would be justified. If charity were regarded 
as more important than productivity, then more than half of one’s time, effort, 
and other resources should be devoted to others. In the limit, the elevation of 
charity as a strategy of behavior to be pursued on a large scale would be 
suicidal. It would not be a strategy that would yield success in the long-run. 
Woman and the Dynamo (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), pp. 307-
11.
30 Isabel Paterson, The God of the Machine (Caldwell, ID: The Caxton Printers, Inc., 
1968), pp. 250-51. 
31 Leonard Peikoff, “The Philosophy of Objectivism,” Lecture Series, no. 8 (1976), 
quoted in The Ayn Rand Lexicon, ed. Harry Binswanger (New York: New American 
Library, 1986), pp. 50-51.  
32 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, pp. 332-33. These cases for charitable giving are 
illustrative, not exhaustive. 
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Not only would the individual’s life be at risk, but also the potential recipients 
of charity would be as well. 
Can it be concluded that charity is not principled behavior since it 
does not contribute directly to a person’s own survival?  To clarify, it was not 
Rand’s position that a person should not give to charity.33 However, Peikoff 
asserts that when it comes to a person’s purpose, even mild self-sacrifice “is 
to declare war on life at the root.”34 There are three related principles that are 
relevant to the question of whether charity is a sacrifice. One is that “one 
should be productive.”  The fuller statement of this is that “one should not 
consume more than he produces.”  The third is that “value should be 
exchanged for value.” 
With regard to the last of these statements, it would seem that most 
individuals benefit from the productivity of others without paying or fully 
paying the costs. For example, most, if not all, individuals benefit from the 
advancements in knowledge made by others, whether the benefactors are 
living or deceased.35 Advancements in knowledge could be the result of basic 
research, invention or innovation, and/or creative work. There is an 
“inheritance” of knowledge with which most individuals are endowed. The 
reason that individuals do not pay or fully pay for this “inheritance” is because 
there is a lack of property rights in the discovery of basic knowledge and 
limited property rights (copyrights and patents) in creative work and 
inventions. Therefore, the discoverers or creators cannot charge or indefinitely 
charge for their use. They are uncompensated or under-compensated. In that 
sense, the beneficiaries have “consumed” more than they have “produced.”  
Value has not been exchanged for value. A debt is owed that cannot be repaid 
to those who have bestowed advancements in knowledge upon others.36
Similarly, as Isabel Paterson notes, those who live in free countries 
have a great inheritance of freedom.37 Although freedom may be a right, it is 
not without cost. There is a debt owed to those who have discovered, 
established, defended, and preserved freedom. They were not fully 
compensated for the endowment they bestowed on others. Of course, these 
33 Ayn Rand, “The Ethics of Emergencies,” in Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness.
34 Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Dutton, 
1991), p. 232. 
35  Rand, “This Is John Galt Speaking,” p. 186. 
36 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, pp. 326-28. 
37 Paterson, The God in the Machine, p. 306. 
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benefactors, many of whom are dead, cannot be reimbursed. Therefore, 
individuals who live in free countries are, by and large, net beneficiaries. They 
have received a benefit without having paid the cost.38
7. In Deciding between an Ethical Action and an Unethical Action, the 
Expected Loss Should Be Ignored for the Ethical Choice, but Not for the 
Unethical Alternative 
Generally speaking, an ethical person would not include an unethical 
alternative among those in his decision set. However, in the event that this 
was the case, the decision should be based on the expected gain of the ethical 
choice versus the expected value of the unethical choice.39 In other words, the 
expected loss for the ethical choice should be ignored (when making the 
decision). This follows from the BUP, which states that if one chooses 
rationally (ethically), one should expect success. Failure could occur, because 
it would be unexpected. Peikoff asserts that with respect to failure, “if there’s 
a chance at all,” then a person should not succumb to it.40 I interpret this to 
mean that for an ethical choice, the loss should be ignored.41 This would not 
be true for the unethical alternative, however.42
38 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, pp. 328-34. 
39 Ibid., pp. 286-93. The expected value is equal to the sum of the expected payoffs for 
each “state of nature.”  Associated with each state of nature is a probability. In the 
most fundamental decisions, the states of nature would be life and death. The loss 
under the death state would equal the person’s human capital. This could be expressed 
in utility terms rather than dollars or some other unit of account. The loss would be 
factored by the probability of dying to obtain the expected loss. This would be added 
to the expected gain under the life state to obtain the expected value. This assumes that 
the probabilities are known or estimable. There are other decision criteria that may be 
used for decisions under risk or uncertainty. The point is that in making a decision 
between an ethical choice and an unethical alternative, the loss for the ethical 
alternative may be ignored, but it cannot be ignored for the unethical one.  
40 Peikoff, “The Philosophy of Objectivism.” 
41 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, pp. 342-43. 
42 As mentioned, for an ethical person, the choice between an ethical and an unethical 
action should be rare. This does not mean that it could never happen. As Chris 
Sciabarra notes, it is unlikely that a parent would be truthful to his child’s kidnapper; 
see Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 245.  
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8. In Deciding Between Two Ethical Alternatives, Either the Expected 
Gain or the Expected Value May Be Used 
It would seem to follow that when a decision is limited to ethical 
alternatives, the decision should be based on the respective gains of the 
alternatives, since success is the to-be-expected for ethical choices. This 
would be the case if the expected loss for each alternative were relatively 
incidental. However, there are some instances in which the expected loss for 
an alternative may be quite large. Although success is the to-be-expected, this 
does not mean that there is no chance of loss. In some circumstances, it would 
not be wise to ignore the expected loss of a decision. (It is not only the loss 
that is relevant, but also the probability of its occurrence. The loss would be 
weighted by that probability.)  For these kinds of decisions, the expected 
values of each of the alternatives would be relevant. The expected value may 
also be used in decisions that have no ethical content, such as deciding 
between whether to purchase a white shirt or a blue shirt. 
9. Because Many Individuals Are Net Beneficiaries of the Productivity of 
Uncompensated Others, It Would Not Be a “Sacrifice” to Make 
Unilateral Contributions to Others 
Since many individuals have benefited from the productive efforts of 
others who have not been fully compensated, many individuals have on 
balance consumed more than they have produced. Value has not been 
exchanged for value. Therefore, for many individuals, it would not be a 
“sacrifice” to make charitable contributions (unilateral transfers) to others if 
those contributions are believed to be justified. However, as noted, a single 
individual could not give to all of those other individuals who are justifiably 
in need, even if those in need represented a small percentage of the 
population. Even if a person devoted all of his time and income to others, it 
would not satisfy the need. Thus, it would be helpful if there was some “rule-
of-thumb” or heuristic to guide a person’s charitable giving. 
The rule-of-thumb that I have devised is based on my interpretation 
of the BUP, which, in effect, states that if a person behaves rationally, then he 
can expect success. Misfortune is the exception in life—incidental. Success is 
the norm. Since survival is the measure of success, in the most basic terms, 
this would mean that the expectation is that if one is rational, one can expect 
to survive. Ultimately, death is inevitable, but even if one lives rationally, 
there is always a probability of unexpected death. For a given year, then, a 
person’s expected income equals the probability that he will survive 
multiplied by his income for that year plus the probability he will die 
multiplied by zero—since he would earn zero income from his “human 
capital” if he died. If he survives the year, then the difference between the 
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actual income he receives and his expected income is a bonus, so to speak—
the result of “good luck.”43
Since it is unexpected and “incidental,” it can be given to charity, 
without “sacrifice.”  A person who had suffered misfortune (other than death) 
would be under no (moral) obligation to give to charity, since his needs would 
need to be met.  
10. A “Heuristic for Giving” Is Useful Because Charitable Giving Is 
Outside the Market System 
A rule-of-thumb for giving to charities is useful because charity is 
outside the market system. There is a cost to charitable giving, and 
organizations exist to facilitate it; however, it is unlike other market goods in 
that there is no pricing mechanism as such.44 The market system tends to be 
self-regulating because prices perform the function of signaling information to 
consumers, producers, and input providers as well as providing the incentive 
to act on that information. There is no such mechanism for charitable giving. 
There may be people in need, but those who may be willing to give may be 
unaware of who they are. There may be people willing to give, but may not 
have sufficient information about those in need. Individuals tend to be very 
generous when they have information. An example of the generosity of 
individuals is the outpouring of giving that followed September 11. The media 
supplied the information in this instance. However, when charitable 
organizations experienced bottlenecks, there was no mechanism to inform 
those who gave. Again, reliance was on the media, but it was a blunt tool in 
comparison to the price system. 
Additionally, for those who envision charitable giving as an absolute 
virtue, there may be a tendency to sacrifice too much. For those who see 
charitable giving as a sacrifice, the tendency may be not to give at all. A rule-
43 This would equal the probability of dying multiplied by the actual income received 
for the year. For example, if the probability of death was 10 percent, and a person’s 
actual income for a year was $50,000, then his expected income for the year would 
have been $45,000 (the probability of survival multiplied by the amount of the yearly 
income if one lives plus the probability of dying multiplied by zero—the amount 
received if one dies). The difference between the actual income and the expected 
income would be one’s expected loss, which would equal the probability of dying 
multiplied by the yearly income.   
44 A defining characteristic of a market is a price mechanism. Charitable organizations 
exist to match givers with recipients, but, although costs are involved, because there is 
not price per se, there is no market as such. 
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of-thumb can be helpful to limit giving to some reasonable amount for the 
former and encourage the latter by providing an objective standard.45
11. Further Discussion 
Rand thinks that a person should help another person during an 
emergency situation, with the proviso that it is not at the expense of one’s 
own life. She describes emergencies as unexpected circumstances that are 
limited in time. Examples would be natural disasters, such as earthquakes or 
floods. It is strictly in emergencies that a person should help strangers, so long 
as one is capable of it. Rand views non-emergencies, for instance, poverty and 
illness, as normal risks of being alive. A person may provide assistance to a 
person in need, out of a sense of benevolence not because of need per se, if it 
is limited in duration. Thus, assistance would not extend to providing help for 
the recipient’s entire life. Nor would it encompass spending one’s life 
searching for needy people to help.46
 Rand uses the verb “should” as pertaining to emergencies, but “may” 
with regard to helping others in non-emergencies. The way I interpret this is 
that an emergency is exceptional in the sense that a person would not estimate 
the benefits and costs of taking action and compare these with other 
alternatives that might be open to him. There could be other things that he 
could do instead that would have greater value, but he would forgo those in 
order to provide assistance during the emergency. The only qualification 
would be that the action would not risk his life. 
For non-emergencies, the verb “may” is used: a person may help 
another (if that person is not evil) with the added qualifications that the 
contribution should be within the giver’s means and that the assistance ought 
to be of limited duration. This would seem to indicate that calculation in these 
instances would be warranted. Rand opposes sacrificing one’s own life to 
relieve suffering. Because disasters are not the norm in life, assistance to 
others should be “marginal and incidental.”47 This follows from the BUP. 
In Unrugged Individualism, David Kelley extends the motivation for 
benevolence by arguing that, generally speaking, it is “a kind of investment in 
this sense: one invests one’s time, attention, and concern in people in order to 
create opportunities for trade, even though many of them won’t pan out.”48
45 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, pp. 325 and 343-47. 
46 Rand, “The Ethics of Emergencies,” pp. 47-48. 
47 Ibid., p. 49; cf. Paterson, pp. 250-54. 
48 David Kelley, Unrugged Individualism (Poughkeepsie, NY: Institute for Objectivist 
Studies, 1996), p. 47. 
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That is, benevolence is a “nonspecific investment in their potential.”49
Kelley’s reasoning is that since trading opportunities do not simply emerge 
unaided, individuals must initiate them by “treating other people as potential 
traders.”50
Rand views charity as being of secondary importance. Since, based 
on the BUP, suffering is not-to-be-expected, virtues that are related to 
suffering are of lesser significance.51 However, because Kelley regards 
benevolence as a response to the trade potential of others and not to their 
suffering, he promotes it to a major virtue.52 Kelley views this kind of giving 
as non-sacrificial and in one’s self-interest.53 The decision process is not 
unlike any other economic decision.54 Of course, the key difference is that the 
“investor” is not a direct beneficiary of this kind of expenditure. 
Tibor Machan’s focus is on generosity in his Generosity: Virtue in 
Civil Society. He regards generosity as one among many benevolent virtues, 
which also include charity, kindness, compassion, and thoughtfulness. 
Although the boundary lines among these are not always well-defined, 
generosity would encompass such activities as bestowing gifts, rendering 
counsel, and being tolerant.55  Unlike charity, which typically requires 
deliberation, generosity is spontaneous; that is, it is second-nature.56 Like 
other virtues, generosity is a trait that is self-cultivated.57 It requires discretion 
and intent, but does not involve calculation.58 Unlike exchange, it is not self-
interested in the sense that it involves a quid pro quo or tit-for-tat.59 However, 
49 Ibid., p. 50. 
50 Ibid., p. 26. 
51 Ibid., p. 14. 
52 Ibid., pp. 17 and 33. 
53 Ibid., p. 7. 
54 Ibid., p. 50. 
55 Tibor R. Machan, Generosity: Virtue in Civil Society (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 1998), p. 1. 
56 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
57 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
58 Ibid., pp. 23 and 6. 
59 Ibid., pp. 3 and 20. 
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generosity is self-beneficial by virtue of contributing to a morally good life. 
Yet, there is no self-sacrifice in generosity as there can be with charitable 
giving.60
In “The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity,” Douglas Den 
Uyl views charity as “supply-sided” rather than “demand-sided.”  That is, the 
focus is on the giver rather than the recipient.61 Charity is a self-directed 
virtue that springs from the classical, self-perfective ethical model.62 The 
central theme of the classical paradigm in ethics is that “the good is brought 
into being by the achievements of the self.”63 One of Den Uyl’s aims is to 
examine whether there exists a reductionist tendency inherent in liberal 
philosophy to collapse charity and justice and, if so, to inquire whether the 
existence of the virtue of charity is at risk. 
Justice in Objectivism is defined by the Trader Principle. I view 
justice to be reflected in the more encompassing principle of reciprocity, 
which subsumes the Trader Principle. Den Uyl examines Lawrence Becker’s 
reciprocity argument as it applies to giving. The basis for Becker’s argument, 
given in his book Reciprocity, is that people are benefactors of positive 
externalities.64 It follows that, in response, people should feel a sense of 
obligation about giving. Den Uyl notes that Becker’s case is recipient-
oriented.65 The case that I have made may seem to be reciprocity-based in 
Becker’s sense. It is not. My point is that, because the giver is not the primary 
beneficiary, charity may appear to be self-sacrificial, based on a literal reading 
of some passages of Objectivist Ethics (OE). However, if it is recognized that 
most people have benefited from others without reciprocating, then it need not 
be viewed that way. Since many individuals are net beneficiaries of actions of 
others (whom it would be impossible directly to repay), then a person who 
chooses to make a charitable contribution will not necessarily be “worse off” 
on balance.  
60 Ibid., p. 3. 
61 Douglas J. Den Uyl, “The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity,” Social 
Philosophy & Policy 10, no. 1 (1993), p. 205. 
62 Ibid., p. 202. 
63 Ibid., p. 205. 
64 Lawrence Becker, Reciprocity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
65 Den Uyl, “The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity,” p. 222. 
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The emphasis here is not on the recipient. Individuals may give to 
others out of good will. Others’ need, however, cannot be a justification—or a 
sole justification—for giving, since there are always others in need. This does 
not mean that misfortune is not marginal in a global sense, as the BUP 
suggests. However, from a single person’s perspective, one cannot satisfy all 
of the need, however insignificant it may be in a “universal” sense. Den Uyl 
rightly points out that if reciprocity formed the basis for giving, “each of our 
lives could be perpetually mortgaged to whatever someone’s conception of 
our obligation to reciprocate might be.”66 Thus, even though the “net 
beneficiary” argument that I present may explain why charitable giving need 
not be a sacrifice, it provides no guidance for how much to give. In this sense, 
not unlike the altruist doctrine, there is no limit provided. Giving is open-
ended. My aim has been to provide a heuristic, or rule-of-thumb, as a 
reasonable guide to giving.  
12. Concluding Remarks       
Homo economicus is a calculator. He is seen as measuring benefits 
and costs, applying the principle of maximization to the alternatives that face 
him for every decision.67 Economists point out that the decision process may 
not be a conscious effort. As an analogy, pitching in baseball does not require 
knowledge of physics, even though physical laws are involved. Even so, as 
illustrated in texts on consumer theory, the process of utility maximization 
would seem to entail some deliberation. Machan envisions virtues as 
ingrained characteristics. As cultivated traits, they require no deliberation.68
 Fred Groh says that Machan challenges “the rule-following 
conception of morality, which implies that one must deliberate and calculate 
about what to do.”69 I view “rule-following” as non-deliberative, that is, as 
applying a rule with little or no thought involved. Calculating behavior, on the 
other hand, would be typified by “pure economic man”—estimating benefits 
and costs at every turn. OE would seem to me to be at odds with these two 
approaches to decision-making. In OE, the decision-maker neither applies a 
rule nor in all cases does he calculate. The former is non-thought; the latter 
requires constantly weighing and measuring. Rand envisions ethical decisions 
as contextual. As such, it would seem that some decisions would require less 
deliberation than others—although as Machan notes, all decisions would 
66 Ibid., p. 223. 
67 Machan, Generosity, p. 72. 
68 Ibid., p. 1. 
69 Fred Groh, “Helping Hands,” Navigator 2, no. 3 (November 1998), p. 15. 
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require discretion.70 Machan’s view seems to me in some respects to be 
consistent with the way in which I have interpreted the application of the 
BUP. Ethical decisions do not require that a person estimate the loss for an 
ethical choice since failure is the not-to-be expected, at least in the long-run. 
In deciding between an ethical choice and one that is not, no deliberation at all 
should be required. The ethical choice leads to success long-range. Only in 
deciding among ethical alternatives might the expected gain become relevant 
so long as the expected loss for each alternative is similar in magnitude. The 
expected values may pertain if the expected losses significantly vary in size.  
The problem with charity is that the giver does not directly benefit 
from his decision. If charitable giving ranked first on one’s scale of values, 
then it could justifiably consume all of one’s productive capability, income, 
and time. At the limit, it would be suicidal, potentially robbing the charity 
recipient of his life as well. Viewed in this way, it is understandable that Rand 
relegates charity to a secondary virtue and regards it is as parasitical. Using 
the reasoning I have set forth in making ethical decisions, an altruist, who by 
Rand’s definition consistently puts others above oneself, would consider only 
the expected benefits that would accrue to another or others. The personal 
losses would be ignored. An approach of only recognizing the expected 
benefits of a decision may be justified so long as adherence to the ethic leads 
to the decision-maker’s survival. The same approach as applied to altruism 
leads to the polar outcome.71
At the other extreme, a strict interpretation, or perhaps 
misinterpretation, of OE might lead one to conclude that any amount of 
charitable giving would be sacrificial. Peikoff views ethics as being either/or 
in nature. Even a small sacrifice is self-denying, and, therefore, evil.72 Kelley 
is aware of this dilemma, stating that altruism “offers no principled guidance 
on how to draw the line” between ourselves and others.73 As for benevolent 
non-specific investments in potential traders, Kelley views these expenditures 
as being no different from any others that we do for ourselves. Machan sees 
generosity as non-sacrificial, but recognizes that charity could be.74 As Den 
Uyl notes, some arguments for charity, such as the reciprocity-based 
70 Machan, Generosity, p. 23. 
71 Touchstone, Then Athena Said, p. 339. 
72 Peikoff, Objectivism, p. 273. 
73 Kelley, Unrugged Individualism, p. 50. 
74 Machan, Generosity, p. 3. 
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arguments, are open-ended.75 I offer, as a guideline for charitable giving, the 
rule-of-thumb discussed above—that is, an amount equivalent to the expected 
loss for a year equal to the probability of dying multiplied by one’s income. I 
believe a reasonable guideline is helpful as an antidote to the altruist doctrine 
of “giving until it hurts,” and the possible misinterpretation of Rand, that 
anything that is not directly life-preserving is evil. A guideline is also helpful 
because there is no market mechanism for charitable giving that deals with 
“shortages” and “surpluses” in the way in which they are automatically 
handled when prices are present. 
 Charitable giving should create no significant hardship on the giver, 
particularly since suffering, according to the BUP, is marginal in nature. 
There is the potential problem, known as moral hazard, that the supply of 
recipients may increase as giving increases. The rule-of-thumb aids in fitting 
charitable donations in perspective in relation to a person’s other 
expenditures. 
APPENDIX A 
Dominant Strategy 
In a zero-sum game, one person’s payoff is simply the negative of 
the other person’s, since a person’s gain is the other’s loss. Therefore only one 
payoff matrix is needed. Consider the following, where A’s and B’s strategies 
are shown in the first row and column, respectively: 
                          B              
     1 2 3
1 4b 1a,b 5b 1*
2 3 0a 2 0
A
4 1* 5
In zero-sum games, amounts can be redistributed but not created or 
produced.76 If each player knew what the other was going to do, the game 
would be trivial. It is assumed that each does not. So if player A was to 
choose his Strategy 1, player B would choose his Strategy 2 with a value of 1 
75 Den Uyl, “The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity,” p. 223. 
76 Alpha C. Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 2nd ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974), pp. 743-44. 
54
Reason Papers Vol. 30 
for A; because of the three values (4, 1, and 5), this involves the least gain for 
A. If A chose Strategy 2, B would choose Strategy 2, so that A would gain 0. 
If B chose his Strategy 1, A would choose Strategy 1 with a gain to A of 4. If 
B selected his Strategy 2, A would opt for Strategy 1 with a gain of 1. And if 
B played Strategy 3, A would again prefer Strategy 1, with a gain of 5.77
There will be only one equilibrium point. It has the value 1 (shown above 
with an asterisk). This results in a maximin result for player A. That is, the 
maximin reasoning for player A is that the least A could gain using Strategy 1 
is 1, and the least he could gain employing Strategy 2 is 0. Of these two 
values, the greater is Strategy 1. For B, his is a minimax result. That is, if he 
plays his Strategy 1, the most A can get is 4. With B’s Strategy 2, the most A 
can win is 1. If B tries Strategy 3, the best A can do is 5. Of these three, the 
least is 1. The value of the game is said to be 1. Also if A’s two strategies are 
examined for overall gain, regardless of what B does, A is better off choosing 
Strategy 1. Similarly if B’s strategies are compared, B does best by choosing 
Strategy 2 regardless of what strategy A follows because B’s Strategy 2 offers 
the least return to A of the three strategies open to B. So A should play 
Strategy 1 and B should play his Strategy 2, and if they both pursue these 
courses of action, they will end up at 1, the value of the game. 
When there are two players, the maximin and minimax principles 
have certain properties that can work to the advantage of each player. By 
following the maximin strategy, A attains the largest value that can be 
prevented from being reduced further by B, whereas by following the 
minimax strategy, B attains the lowest payoff that can be prevented from 
being increased further by A.78 If A chose a strategy other than the maximin, 
he would be unprotected against a countermove by B. By using their 
respective conservative strategies, each player has the maximum protection 
against his opponent’s countermove. At the equilibrium point, each player’s 
conservative strategy is the most advantageous, so long as the other player 
selects his respective conservative strategy. However, a maximin strategy may 
not be the best strategy as a countermove to a player who does not follow the 
minimax criterion. A prudent strategy is only guaranteed to be good in 
response to another prudent strategy.79
77 William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 438-40. 
78 Ibid., p. 440. 
79 Ibid., pp. 441-42. 
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Mixed Strategies 
Suppose the payoff structure for two players in a zero-sum game was 
as follows: 
                          B              
     1 2
1 90b   30 30
2 50a 100   50* 
A
90* 100 
Player A will choose Strategy 2, his maximin. Player B will select his 
Strategy 1, the minimax. There is no equilibrium.80 If the combination of 
plays begins with (2, 1), where 2 stands for A’s strategy and 1 indicates B’s, B 
will favorably be surprised since a 50 unit gain for A is preferable to B than a 
90 unit gain. But if B has selected his Strategy 1, A can improve his payoff by 
switching to his Strategy 1 (and win 90 instead of 50). Now, however, with A 
having switched to his Strategy 1, B will be better off with his Strategy 2, 
where A has only 30 units instead of 90. But if B changes to his Strategy 2, A 
will prefer his Strategy 2 with a 100 reward. Once A switches to his Strategy 
2, B will countermove with his Strategy 1 where A’s gain falls from 100 to 
50. Now the two are where they began and the cycles will recommence. The 
solution is unstable.81
When one player can predict the pattern of play of another, this can 
be disadvantageous—in military plans or business or any zero-sum arena. In a 
“rational” plan, no player should be capable of deducing his opponent’s 
strategy. Conservative gamesmanship suggests that a mixed strategy would 
yield the optimal results.82 Suppose that the payoff matrix were as follows: 
                    B              
     1 2
1 4 2
A
2 1 3
                                  
80 Ibid., p. 444. 
81 Frederick S. Hillier and Gerald J. Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research
(San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day, Inc., 1967), pp. 269-70. 
82 Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, p. 754. 
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If player B selects his Strategy 1 (a pure strategy), the second column 
becomes irrelevant to A’s decision. If player A uses a mixed strategy, he will 
choose his Strategy 1 x1 percent of the time, and his Strategy 2 x2 percent of 
the time where x2 = (1 – x1). So the expected value of this mixed strategy is E1
= (x1)(4) + (1 – x1)(1). If player B chooses Strategy 2 exclusively, then the 
expected payoff for A would be E2 = (x1)(2) + (1 – x1)(3). If B chose a mixed 
strategy, A’s expected payoff would be between E1 and E2. E1 and E2 can be 
graphed (with E on the vertical and x1 on the horizontal axes). The maximin 
(the maximum of the minimum expected payoffs) will be given by the 
intersection of the two lines. This will correspond to the optimal mixed 
strategy for A. Regardless of what B does, this will be A’s best strategy. 
The same procedure can be followed for player B. That is, if A 
follows Strategy 1, B’s expected payoff is E(1) = (y1)(4) + (1 – y1)(2). And if A 
follows Strategy 2, B’s expected payoff is E(2) = (y1)(1) + (1 – y1)(3). 
Graphing both lines and finding the minimax (where the two lines intersect) 
will give B’s optimal expected payoff along with the optimal percentages for 
y1 and y2. The expected payoff found above for A (maximin) will be the same 
as that found for B (minimax). Thus, if A adopts his optimal mixed strategy 
he cannot receive less than the optimal expected payoff E, and if B follows his 
optimal mixed strategy his opponent can received not more than E.83 If the 
payoff matrix is beyond a (2 x n) or an (m x 2) in dimension, the problem can 
be transformed into a linear programming problem for ease of solution. 
APPENDIX B 
A hypothetical payoff structure for a PD may look as follows (where 
c = cooperation and d = defection): 
                    A              
          c     d 
c 5, 5 0, 10   
B
d 10, 0 2, 2 
                                  
Suppose Player A offers Player B a quantity of dried fruit if B will 
provide him with a quantity of firewood. If they cooperate, that is, trade takes 
place, each will receive a payoff of 5 (measured in units of satisfaction—
utility). If one player fulfills his part of the bargain and the other does not, the 
defector has a payoff of 10 and the sucker has a payoff of zero. If both 
defect—or decide not to interact—the payoff for each is 2. No exchange takes 
83 Ibid., p. 758; Hillier and Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research, p. 272.  
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place. In a one-shot (one-time) exchange the dominant strategy for each 
player is to defect—the non-interaction result. Consider Player A. If Player B 
decides to cooperate, Player A’s best strategy is to defect (for which he will 
receive 10 instead of 5). If Player B decides to defect, A’s best bet is to defect 
(receiving 2 instead of 0). Regardless of what B does, A’s best strategy is to 
defect. Likewise for B.84 So if each person reasons in this way both will 
mutually defect, in which case both will receive 2. They would be better off, 
however, if they cooperated, receiving payoffs of 5 apiece.  
84 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 9. 
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